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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair hN,vi,w h e r eN =
{1,...,n} is a set of players and v:2 N → R is a characteristic function
satisfying v(∅)=0 . For any coalition S ⊆ N, v(S) is the worth of coalition
S,i . e . t h em e m b e r so fS c a no b t a i nat o t a lp a y o ﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to
cooperate.
Ag a m ehN,vi is called
• superadditive,i fv(S∪T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for all S,T ⊆ N with S∩T = ∅;
• convex,i fv(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T) for all S,T ⊆ N.
Clearly, each convex game is also superadditive. The class of convex
games was introduced by Shapley (1971) and has attracted a lot of attention
because the games in this class have very nice properties: for example, the
core of a convex game is the unique stable set and its extreme points can be
easily described; moreover, the Shapley value is in the barycenter of the core.
This importance explains also the existence of many characterizations of
convex games. For example, the above deﬁnition of convexity (that uses the
supermodularity property of the characteristic function) is equivalent to the
fact that for convex games the gain made when individuals or groups join
large coalitions is higher than when they join smaller coalitions. For these and
other characterizations of convex games that deal with the relation between
the core and the Weber set we refer the reader to Shapley (1971), Ichiishi
(1981), Curiel and Tijs (1991), and Curiel (1997).
The purpose of this note is to provide a new characterization (to the best
of our knowledge) of convex games that uses the notion of a marginal game.
22M o t i v a t i o n
Given a game hN,vi and a coalition T ⊆ N,t h eT-marginal game vT :
2N\T → R is deﬁned by vT(S): =v(S ∪ T) − v(T) for each S ⊆ N \ T.
Marginal games turned out to be very useful not only for proving the fact
that the core of a game is a subset of its Weber set (cf. Weber (1988)) but also
when constructing an appropriate algorithm for generating the constrained
egalitarian solution for convex games (cf. Dutta and Ray (1989)).
Two of the main questions one can ask with respect to the marginal games
hN \ T,vTi of an original game hN,vi are the following: (1) if the original
game is convex, are all its marginal games also convex?, and (2) if the original
game is superadditive, are all its marginal games also superadditive?
The answer of the ﬁrst question is positive (and we show this when pro-
viding our characterization result), while the answer of the second question
is negative as exempliﬁed below.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3} and v({1})=1 0 , v({1,2})=1 2 , v({1,3})=
11, v({1,2,3})=1 2 1
2,a n dv(S)=0for all other S ⊂ N. Clearly, the
game hN,vi is superadditive. Its {1}-marginal game is given by v{1}({2})=
v({1,2}) − v ({1})=2 , v{1}({3})=1 1− 10 = 1,a n dv{1}({2,3})=2 1
2.
Since v{1}({2,3})=2 1





However, as we will show next, the superadditivity of each marginal game
hN \ T,vTi of an original game hN,vi pushes the game hN,vi to satisfy a
stronger property - that of convexity.
33R e s u l t
Theorem 1 Ag a m ehN,vi is convex if and only if for each T ∈ 2N the
T-marginal game hN \ T,vTi is superadditive.
Proof. (i) Suppose hN,vi is convex and let T ⊆ N.T a k eS1,S 2 ⊆ N \ T.
Then
vT(S1 ∪ S2)+vT (S1 ∩ S2)
= v(T ∪ S1 ∪ S2)+v (T ∪ (S1 ∩ S2)) − 2v(T)
= v((T ∪ S1) ∪ (T ∪ S2)) + v((T ∪ S1) ∩ (T ∪ S2)) − 2v(T)
≥ v(T ∪ S1)+v(T ∪ S2) − 2v(T)
=( v(T ∪ S1) − v(T)) + (v (T ∪ S2) − v(T))
= vT(S1)+vT(S2),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of v.H e n c e , vT is convex
(and superadditive as well).
(ii) Suppose that for each T ∈ 2N the game hN \ T,vTi is superadditive.
Take S1,S 2 ⊆ N.W eh a v et op r o v et h a t
v (S1 ∪ S2)+v(S1 ∩ S2) ≥ v(S1)+v(S2).
If S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, then the assertion easily follows from the superadditivity
of the game hN \ ∅,v ∅i = hN,vi and v(∅)=0 .
Suppose now S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅ and let T := S1 ∩ S2.B e c a u s e hN \ T,vTi is
superadditive, we have that
vT (S1 \ T)+vT (S2 \ T) ≤ vT ((S1 ∪ S2) \ T)
iﬀ
v(S1) − v(T)+v(S2) − v(T) ≤ v (S1 ∪ S2) − v(T)
4iﬀ
v(S1)+v(S2) ≤ v (S1 ∪ S2)+v(T)
iﬀ
v(S1)+v(S2) ≤ v(S1 ∪ S2)+v(S1 ∩ S2).
Having provided our characterization, we can answer immediately the
following question: “Under which conditions are all marginal games of a su-
peradditive original game superadditive?”
Corollary 1 Let hN,vi be a superadditive game. Then hN \ T,vTi is su-
peradditive for each T ∈ 2N if and only if hN \ T,vTi is convex for each
T ∈ 2N.
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